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August, 1951
LOSS OF USE AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
RICHARD D. HALL
of the Denver Bar
Last year 54,157 vehicles in Colorado were involved in auto
accidents according to the records of the Colorado Department of
Revenue. The use of almost all of these cars was lost for some
period of time while they were being repaired, and undoubtedly
the owners of about one-half of these cars made some claim for
damages. In view of this large number of liability claims which
include, or could include, a demand for loss of use as well as other
elements of special damage, one would reasonably expect there
would be an extensive body of law on the subject. The very re-
verse, however, is true in Colorado, and as a result attorneys
making loss of use claims usually find themselves uncertain as to
the law in this state.
Regarding the pleading of this loss of use element of dam-
ages, it is well settled in Colorado that such loss of use is an item
of special damages and must be specially pleaded.' Similarly, it
is clear that in proving his claim for loss of use of a vehicle, a
plaintiff must prove that the vehicle was necessarily unavailable
for use during the period of time reasonably necessary for the
repair of the vehicle with ordinary diligence.2  Such period of
time does not, however, include the time during which the vehicle
was unnecessarily unavailable because the owner failed to reach
a decision promptly as to whether or not to have the vehicle re-
paired, or as to where the repair work was to be done.'
Assuming the plaintiff has properly pleaded his claim and
has proven the period for which the loss of use is claimed, there
is presented the difficult problem of proving with a reasonable
degree of certainty the amount of such loss of use damages. In
Hunter v. Quaintance,4 the plaintiff's Oakland automobile was
badly damaged in an accident, and as part of his proof of dam-
ages the plaintiff offered evidence at the trial as to the value of
its use for the two months during which it was being repaired.
The trial court instructed the jury that:
The correct measure of damage in this case is the
reasonable cost of repairing said Quaintance's automo-
bile in order to put it in as good condition as it was in
before the injury complained of . . . plus any direct loss
the said Quaintance may have sustained by reason of
the loss of the use of said automobile during a reasonable
length of time for its repair . . .
'Rule 9(g), Rules of Civil Procedure; Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P.
918 (1917).
2 Allen v. Brown, 159 Minn. 61, 198 N.W. 137 (1924) ; Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31,
17 N.W. 2d 824 (1945) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp. 559 (D. Okla.
1946) ; Adams v. Burnett, 150 So. 403 (La. App. 1932).
3 See cases in n. 2, supra.
469 Colo. 28, 168 P. 918 (1917).
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After a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed
to the Colorado Supreme Court which, in considering the submis-
sion to the jury of the plaintiff's loss of use claim, stated:
It is urged that, the evidence showing that the car
was used only for purposes of pleasure, there is no basis
for estimating the damage from the loss of such use.
Cases are cited which hold that the damage from such a
source is too speculative to be considered. We are. in-
clined to agree with that opinion.
The court then proceeded to point out that the alleged loss of use
damage had not been pleaded and that the issue of negligence sub-
mitted to the jury had not been confined to acts of negligence
alleged in the complaint and then reversed the judgment "for the
reasons above given."
Although the supreme court certainly could have been more
positive in its statement, this case in the writer's opinion does
establish for Colorado the doctrine that a party who loses the use
of a vehicle used by him solely for pleasure and general family
purposes and who sustains no specific out-of-pocket expense as
a direct result of such loss of use, cannot recover compensation for
such loss of use. In the writer's opinion this doctrine still applies
in Colorado although the plaintiff can prove a definite rental value
for vehicles of the type damaged in the accident, and although the
majority rule in other jurisdictions would seem to be to the con-
trary.5
Since a car owned for pleasure and family purposes may sit
in the garage all day or be used for only a few minutes in a day,
it would seem improper to apply a full day's rental value as a
measure of damages resulting from loss of use in such a case.
Also, the rental value of such a car is not a measure of the incon-
venience caused by the loss of use of a car used for such purposes,
and such evidence in such a case would still leave a judgment for'
a sum of money up to speculation and conjecture. This rule has
been objected to as placing at a disadvantage a plaintiff who lacks
the credit or available cash to rent a replacement vehicle,6 though
finds minority support in other jurisdictions besides Colorado. 7
DAMAGE CANNOT BE SPECULATIVE
This case of Hunter v. Quaintance does not in the writer's
opinion establish as a rule that the loss of use of any vehicle used"only for purposes of pleasure" is not recoverable under any and
all circumstances. Since the reason given for the disallowance of
5Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498 (1935) ; Parilli
v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 260 N.Y.S 60 (1932) ; Longworth v. McGrath, 108 Conn. 738,
143 A. 845 (1928).
6 Naughton Mulgrew Mtr. Car Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 173 N.Y.S. 437 (1918)
Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 68 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (1947).
,Goode v. Hantz, 209 La. 821, 25 So. 2d 604 (1946) ; Adams v. Burnett, 150 So.
403 (La. App. 1933); Kane v. Carpet-Dover Merc. Co:, 206 Ark. 674, 177 S.W. 2d
41 (1944).
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such item in this case was the highly speculative nature of the
damages in the case, the court could very logically hold that a
plaintiff who, for example, is a tourist using his car solely for
purposes of pleasure and who rents a substitute car during the
time the use of his own is necessarily lost can recover the amount
of the car rental bill actually incurred by him. Similarly, where
the plaintiff has used the car solely to go to and from work and
for general pleasure purposes and has rented a substitute car or
incurred bus fares while his own car was laid up for repairs, he
should be able to recover the amounts actually so expended by him.
This latter set of facts is found in the case of Longo v. Monast 8
in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island did allow such a
loss of use claim.
In the writer's opinion, Hunter v. Quaintance does not hold
by implication that the loss of use of a vehicle used solely for
commercial or .business purposes is always recoverable. In Inter-
urban Transp. Co. v. F. Strauss & Sons,9 the plaintiff's bus was
damaged in an accident, and the bus company lost the use of it
while necessary repairs were being made. However, in view of
the fact that the plaintiff owned an extra bus which it kept for
such emergencies and used in this case, the court held that the
alleged damages for loss of use of the larger and more comfortable
damaged bus were too speculative under the evidence to support
a recovery. From these examples it can be seen that the real issue
in these cases is not whether a so-called "pleasure" use or "com-
mercial or business" use is involved, but whether the evidence as
to the damages arising from the loss of use is sufficiently definite
and certain to warrant a recovery.
Where the plaintiff can prove actual disbursements for rental
of cars or trucks, taxicab fares, bus fares, or train or airplane
fares as a direct result of the loss of use of a vehicle, such dis-
bursements are by the vast weight of authority recoverable by the
plaintiff.l0 Many difficult questions arise, however, when the al-
leged direct financial loss is claimed to be a loss of personal earn-
ings or profits because of the loss of use of the vehicle or other
property. In Parks v. Sullivan," the surveying instruments belong-
ing to the plaintiff were damaged beyond repair by the defendant's
wagon, and it allegedly took the plaintiff 20 days to procure a new
set. The judgment of the trial court allowing plaintiff damages
in the sum of $5.00 per day for 20 days to cover his loss of earn-
ings allegedly resulting from the loss of use of such instruments
was reversed on appeal by the Colorado Supreme Court which
noted that the testimony failed to show that plaintiff was unable
to perform any other work than surveying during the 20 day
870 R I. 460, 40 A. 2d 433 (1944).
0196 So. 467 (La. App., 1940).
10 see cases collected in 169 A.L.R. 1087, 1117; 5 Am. Jur. (Automobiles) § 750,
25 C.J.S. (Damages) § 41.
146 Colo. 340, 104 P. 1035 (1909).
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period, and further noted that the accident did not necessarily
prevent his employment in work other than that requiring the
use of the surveying instruments. However, if the plaintiff had
clearly proven that he attempted to find other employment but
was unsuccessful, that other surveying instruments could not be
obtained on a rental basis, and that he procured a new set of in-
struments as soon as possible, the judgment in favor of plaintiff
presumably would have been upheld.
Wherever recovery is sought for diminished earnings or
profits because of the loss of use of a vehicle, it would seem that
the plaintiff would be required to establish as part of his proof
the unavailability of a temporary replacement on a rental basis.' 2
This would follow from the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate dam-
ages. Also the plaintiff would be required to prove an established
business under the law setting forth this limitation on any recov-
ery for loss of profits or earnings based on commissions.
13
The case of Parks v. Sullivan, supra, is important too in that
the Colorado Supreme Court in that case by implication accepted
the view that damages for loss of use are allowable not only for
the period during which an article is being repaired, but also for
the period necessarily spent by the plaintiff in replacing a non-
repairable article with a new one. This is probably the minority
rule, 14 but in the writer's opinion it is much more reasonable and
logical than the majority rule.
Where the plaintiff is seeking recovery for the loss of use of
a vehicle during the period it was necessarily being repaired, the
majority of courts have limited the total recovery for repairs and
loss of use to the difference between the value of the vehicle be-
fore and after the accident. ', However, other courts limit the
total recovery only to the value of the vehicle before the accident,
without deduction for the value of the vehicle in its damaged con-
dition after the accident.' 6 The first rule appears more desirable
to this writer, for the plaintiff in making his decision as to whether
to repair or to sell the car in its damaged condition for salvage
should be required to take into consideration the amount of his
prospective loss of use claim plus repair bill as opposed to the
difference in the value of the vehicle before and after the accident,
and should be required to follow the course which keeps his total
damages, including all elements, to the minimum possible.
-Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 279 N.W. 227 (1938); Jellum v. Grays Harbor
Fuel Co., 160 Wash. 585, 295 P. 939 (1931) ; Francischini v. McMullen, 6 N. J. Misc.
736, 142 A. 651 (1928).
" Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 P. 922 (1907); Milheim v.
Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909) ; 15 Am. Jur. p. 819.
"4Glass v. Miller, 51 N.E. 2d 299 (Ohio App. 1940) ; Colonial Mtr. Coach Corp. v.
New York C. R. Co., 228 N.Y.S. 508 (1928) ; Contra: Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727,
238 N.W. 364 (1931) ; German v. Centaur Line Co., 295 S.W. 475 (Mo. App. 1927)
Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W. 2d 824 (1945).
'5 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Qualls, 120 Okla. 49, 250 P. 774 (1926); Cunningham v.
Crane Co., 255 I1. App. 373 (1930).
18Lamb v. Landers, 67 Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E. 2d 321 (1942) ; Atlanta Furniture Co.
v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498 (1935).
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